# THE HOMILETIC VOCABULARY

EDGAR MILSTED TAINTON, JR.

THE [............] [............]

by

Roger William Ralston, Jr.

B. A., University of California, 19[..]


A THESIS

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements

for the degree of


BACHELOR OF DIVINITY
in the
DEPARTMENT OF [...........]
CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC

Berkeley, California

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
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# THE HOMILETIC VOCABULARY

# OUTLINE

## Preface

The task at hand is to bring salvation to mankind in the momentary context of history, made out of all the intersecting lines of personal, cultural, linguistic and political history.

The vocabulary of homiletics is a vocabulary of myth and symbol, a rough and ready instrument which, in its total context, presents important relationships in visual terms and which, out of its context, becomes a collection of idle tales for babes.

An adequate symbolic and mythical vocabulary of ideas means a vocabulary so ingrained with the elements of thinking that control the group within which the vocabulary is to operate, that all circumstances will serve to demonstrate the validity of the ideas contained in the vocabulary. An inadequate vocabulary is one in which the statements do not fit the context. When the statement is so misfit, it does not matter whether the vocabulary indicates true experience or not. It is invalid because inoperative.

That a vocabulary of myth and symbol is illogical and unreasonable is not today a matter of concern. Irrationalism, as René Fülöp-Miller points out, "has intruded itself into the sciences, and has of late gained an increasingly strong hold in the scientific camp."[1]

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1. "The Revolt Against Reason", The Hibbert Journal xxxiv, p. 178

Our current German enemy is, of course, supremely irrational.
"For them the only thing that is fruitful is that which
grows out of race, blood, and soil; whereas, for them,
speculative reason, estranged from life, remains perpetually
barren."[1]  Fülöp-Miller concludes that, while the Nazi
claim of the dawn of a new realm of myth, instinct and creative
force is not entirely true, reason is being forced back
within her true bounds.  The irrational remains as an
"irreducible datum."

To deal with this realm of the irrational, myth is the
only tool available and myth is operative only in its
appropriate context.  Therefore, it is my thesis that the
preacher must persuade man in his own context of history
with myth that makes that context religiously intelligible.

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1. Op. Cit. p. 183

## People in Groups

The subject of the sermon is salvation. The object of
the sermon is people. For the purpose of homiletics, people
are gathered together in groups known as congregations. The
congregation  to which an individual belongs at 11 o'clock
Sunday morning is not the only group of which he is a member
at that moment. Even in a non-advertised world, an individual
is a member of several groups. Modern advertising has
multiplied the number of such psychological crowds. The nature
of the dominant crowd determines the form in which the
homiletical message will be expressed.

To speak of a congregation of Christian people,come together
for the spiritual aid and comfort to be derived from religion,
as a crowd is, perhaps, indelicate. The word contains much
the same freight of connotative meaning as "the mob" or
those "masses" which Alexander Hamilton wished had but one
neck so that he could strangle them. It remains, however,
that the congregation has the characteristics of a psychological
crowd. The force of the liturgy and the atmosphere, the
fact that they are all members of a single communion, combine
to induce a unity which welds together the group. The
individual must then be dealt with as a member of the group.
One of the aims of the preacher is to induce a continuation
of the group feeling strong enough to carry into the
individual's daily life and to withstand the pressure of
other crowds.

A psychological crowd is formed when the individuals which compose it cease to act as individuals but as members of the crowd.  Certain areas of individual thought are surrendered entirely to the crowd.  A man, otherwise rational, who reacts with a mass of party jargon to all political questions, is demonstrating that in that one field he has surrendered his thought to the party.  It is one of the permanent crowds to which he belongs.  The Englishman who wears his dinner jacket at a remote jungle outpost is expressing his membership in another such permanent crowd.  As Everett Dean Martin points out, "Permanent crowds, with the aid of the press, determine in greater or less degree the mental habits of nearly everyone."[1]

LeBon, who pioneered the work on the psychology of crowds, uses the revolutions of 1848 as an example of "crowds" of widely isolated individuals.  The welding element, he feels, was the currency of certain violent revolutionary emotions.[2]  Emotion appears to be the key to the formation of crowds.  Martin, writing from his experience as moderator for a university forum group, declares, "But let the most trivial bit of bathos be expressed in rhythmical cadences and in platitudinous terms, and the most intelligent audience will react as a crowd."[3]  A group, then, is not always a

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1.  Everett Dean Martin The Behavior of Crowds N.Y.
            Harper and Bros. 1920, p. 50

2.  Gustave LeBon The Crowd 2nd. ed. Lon. T. F. Unwin
            1897, p. 3

3.  Op. Cit. p. 26

crowd. A crowd is formed when there is some element that unites individuals more strongly than their personal characteristics throw them apart. All sorts and conditions of men, under the sway of a dominant idea, become a crowd. It is interesting to note that, tho the crowd is emotional, the ideas which weld it together are not necessarily emotional at the outset but become so as the group becomes a crowd. A man who belongs to a Marxist crowd will respond emotionally to such abstracts as "the proletariat," and "the theory of surplus value."

The crowd, LeBon is continually pointing out, is feminine in its behavior.[1] It is edgy, always on the alert and ready to be impelled in any direction. Its reactions are emotional and its intelligence is not high. LeBon says that it is unconscious. Martin wrties that the crowd mind is "first of all, a disturbance of the real. The crowd is the creature of Belief."[2] He classes its psychological behavior with dreams and delusions and automatic behavior generally. In the crowd, both LeBon and Martin agree, the unconscious comes to the surface. Differences between individuals are suppressed and only their uniformity remains. The individual form of the drop of water is lost again in the sea.

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1. Op. Cit. p. 20

2. Op. Cit. p. 31

The unconscious that is released, the sea into which the
drop of water is reabsorbed, is, to LeBon, the fundamental
character of the race. He is a racialist of the extreme
sort as his Psychology of Peoples shows. The point which
he raises is instructive if the race is thought of, in Martin's
term, as the greatest common denominator. The discussion
of individuals is often carried on the basis of the least
common denominator, which represents the margin where the
separate interests of the individuals are joined. For
a crowd movement to have great strength, the appeal is
made to the deepest elements of human life. This appeal
completely oversteps the boundaries of rationality and
finds its expression in such terms as "blood and soil."
This is why acts of the most primitive cruelty are possible
to crowds. If this were all, the formation of crowds would
be a most dangerous thing. Primitive cruelty is not all.
The deeps of the human spirit are also the true sources of
all that is finest and noblest in human nature. LeBon
cites both the crowds which have behaved fiendishly and the
crowds which have died heroically for some idea beyond the
grasp of most of their members.[1] The ideas of justice and
liberty become effective in human life only when the great
crowd has grasped them as a torch to set the world on fire.

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1. LeBon Op. Cit. p. 42

That the crowd is unconscious is axiomatic with the
writers on crowd psychology. It acts on images and visions.
But the unconscious imagery of the crowd is often of
surpassing beauty and posesses a rightness that is not
achieved by intelligence. Languages are formed by the crowd
and express the crowds that form them. Skill with language
may be a thing of the intelligence. Language may be used
to express the refined creations of the mind but it is in
its origin the instrument of the expression of the unconscious
of the crowd.

It is the crowd that creates the legends which are in
themselves the great insights of mankind. The legend is
all the crowd knows of its heroes. It creates the "Little
Corporal", "The Lone Eagle", "The Leader", or "Honest Abe."
These creations have far more strength and vitality than
the original could posess. Men come forward from the crowd
to vouch for the truth of the legend. The crowd turns
its heroes into giants and finds its own identity in them.
Here it must be noted that, tho the crowd loves the tyrant,
it never clothes them with legends that are evil or cruel.
It loves the tyrant because it loves power and because it
must have a leader but its moral valuation of the tyrant
is good according to its own moral standards. Martin
remarks upon the similarity of the social idealism of the
revolutionary crowds of all ages.[1]

1. Op. Cit. p. 200

Two things happen to the individual in the crowd.  He
is both released by the crowd and controlled by it.  Within
the crowd he can relax the inhibitions which controlled his
behavior as a self-conscious individual.  Something has
already been said about this phenomenon as the "greatest
common denominator."  As a member of the crowd he "acquires,
solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible
power which allows him to yield to instincts which, had he
been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint."[1]
Thus the crowd is not an average but something new.  It is the
assertion of the unconscious of the group.

Adolf Hitler, who should be an authority on the subject,
writes of the tremendous power which comes to an individual
when he discovers himself to be a unit in a crowd:

> The mass meeting is necessary if only for the reason
> that in it the individual, who in becoming an
> adherent of a new movement, feels lonely and is
> easily seized with the fear of being alone, receives
> for the first time the picture of a greater community,
> something that has a strengthening and encouraging
> effect on most people--he himself succumbs to the
> magic influence of what we call mass suggestion.
> The will, the longing, but also the force of thousands
> accumulates in every individual.  The man who comes
> to such a meeting doubting and hesitating, leaves
> it confirmed in his mind:  he has become the member
> of a community.[2]

In Christian religion, this is the psychological value
of the Book of Common Prayer, the Church, the Communion of

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1. LeBon Op. Cit. p. 9

2. Adolf Hitler Mein Kampf N.Y. Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939
        p. 715

Saints.  The Roman Catholics often speak of the Mass as
offered simultaneously upon all the altars of the world.
The Protestant Episcopal Church finds its union with the
Anglican communion needs no stronger bulwark than the
usage of the Book of Common Prayer.  The Communion of
Saints allows the Christian to identify himself with a
transcendent unity far beyond himself.

The individual must merge with some crowd.  If he does
not, he is "anti-social" and either goes off to a hermitage
or is incarcerated in a prison or mad-house.  Society finds
it necessary to imprison its extreme individualists because
it is within the crowd that an individual finds his moral
standards.  An individual within the crowd must achieve
his applause by performing in a way approved by the crowd.
The soldier who rescues a comrade or a Nazi who shoots a
Pole is obtaining his recognition according to the standard
set by the crowd to which he belongs.  This necessity which
compells an individual to express himself according to a
pattern set by the crowd is a form of contagion, the most
powerful means of group control.  It is also the means by
which the crowd sets up and deposes its leaders.

There are two different types of crowd leaders, according
to LeBon.[1]  The first is the practical leader.  He arises from
the crowd because he has become so saturated with the ideas
that are fermenting in it that he is a veritable incarnation

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1.  Op. Cit. p. 80

of the crowd itself.  He is forced to the fore-front and
becomes a tool of the crowd in realizing its purpose.
Garibaldi was such a leader.  Once the effort was over, he
slipped back into nonentity, having proved his incompetance
at any other task.  The second type of leader is the true
great man.  Like the first, he is on fire with an idea, but
it is his own idea.  Such is the power of his idea and of
his personality that he can set the crowd on fire.  Where the
first type might be compared with the first flame to lick out
of an internally smouldering coal-heap, the second is as the
torch of the arsonist who sets it afire.  Probably Mussolini
is this second type and Hitler is the first.

On a rough view of history, the first type of leader
would seem to be by far the more common and successful.
Nor is the second type ever completely free of the characteristics
of the first.  For one thing, no idea may be utilized to set
a crowd in motion that is not congenial to that crowd.
LeBon recognizes this when he points out that institutions
which are not "immediately modeled" upon the character of
a people are doomed to destruction as a mere "borrowed
garment, a transitory disguise."[1]

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1. Op. Cit. p. 80  He cites Japan as a particular example of
   a country forced into a borrowed garment by its leaders.
   He saw clearly that the disguise was not a part of the life
   of the people but he foresaw an internal revolution shaking
   off the disguise, not an explosion that would make use
   of western trappings to express the will of a primitive
   and unchanged Japan.

The leader of the crowd has three tools at his disposal.
They are <u>affirmation</u>, <u>repetition</u>, <u>contagion</u>.  These work
on the analogy of a child starting up a current of water
in a fish-pond.  A single paddle with his hand would stir
the water but the movement would die away in eddies unless
he repeated the affirmation and paddled again and again.
Soon the water near him is in general movement.  This movement
carries over to the water on the other side of the pond.
This is contagion, according to LeBon, the slowest acting and
yet most powerful of the means of crowd control.

Affirmation, he says, should be "kept free of all reasoning
and all proof.  The conciser an affirmation is, the more
destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration,
the more weight it carries."[1]  It will be remembered that
Jesus never argued and that the weakest of his statements was
the demonstration of immortality which declared that God
is the God of the living, therefore Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob must live.  The sayings of Jesus which carry most weight
are those which he repeated over and over with many analogies
and illustrations.  Affirmation and repetition in time
form "a current of opinion...and the powerful mechanism
of contagion intervenes."

The principle of contagion, as annunciated by LeBon, is
imitation.  He finds imitation to be a necessity for man,
provided always that it is easy.  Thus the ideas of the

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1. <u>Op. Cit</u>. p. 121

elite penetrate to the crowd which in time realizes them
in a deformed and simplified fashion.  Advertising is
continually making use of this principle, sometimes with
the bald statement, "Everybody's doing it", or, more
subtley, with pictures and testimonials showing everyone
of importance "doing it."

The leader can make these three controls effective only
if the crowd grants him one thing more, prestige.  The is
the crowd's great safeguard which assures it that it gets
the leaders which it deserves.  It is another side of the
crowd's ability to set its own standards.  The surest way
to attain prestige is to achieve success in some manner of
which the crowd heartily approves.  The "Lone Eagle" attained
to such prestige.  He illustrated another principle of prestige
when he went against the current of the crowd and discovered
that "Believers always break the statues of their former gods
with every symptom of fury."[1]  The leader must behave according
to the standard which the crowd has set for its leaders.
An Episcopal minister must not behave in a way perfectly suitable
for a Roman Catholic priest on one hand or a pentecostal
minister on the other.  In most Episcopal churches he can
neither install confessional boxes nor invite the repentent
in the congregation to come forth and testify to the Lord.
Prestige would be withdrawn and his influence would cease.

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1. Op. Cit. p. 131ff

The relation of leader and crowd is often spoken of as
if it were the capture of a group of morons by a brilliant
and cynical opportunist. Such is far from the case. The
leader and the crowd stand in a reciprocal and necessary
relationship. The leader is a part of the crowd and more,
he is its incarnation. The tie of sympathy between the
leader and the crowd must never be broken. He must take
the crowd where it is and must lead it with its own drives
and expressions and according to its own most primitive
feelings. That is not to say that he is a mere tool of
the crowd. He may use its drives for good or for ill but
his pattern of leadership is set for him by the crowd. The
crowd's guarantee that he will conform to that pattern is
its ability to withdraw prestige and so depose him.

In all this, what of the individual? The individual
is formed by the crowds of which he is a member. As well
as he can, he synthesizes their patterns of behavior. Where
the crowds are not consistent with one another, he behaves
according to the pattern set by the dominant crowd. This
pattern of behavior is a pattern of language and it is this
pattern that the preacher must consider when he forms his
homiletic vocabulary.

## The Continued Crisis

The "crisis theologians" appear to have a virtual monopoly upon the word "crisis" as used in connection with man's spiritual necessities. In their terminology, a "crisis" is the intervention of God into history at the moment of most extreme tension, a moment which calls, once and for all, for man's decision for or against God. What I wish to indicate in this thesis by the word "crisis" might, I suppose, be indicated by "crux" and "crucial." Yet I wish to include the element of tension and of decision. The word "crux" adequately represents the idea of the context of history in the sense of a number of lines intersecting in the moment. "Crucial" might represent the predicament of man at his particular point of history. I prefer to use "crisis" as shorthand for these two words in the sense of man's predicament in the context of history.

By "predicament", I mean man's sense of his own inadequacy in the face of those disintegrative forces which he perceives to be undermining all his effort. The "crisis theologians" declare that this inadequacy is only made adequate beyond history. The humanistic theologians say that with God's help, man can overcome his difficulties. It seems to me that a religious approach to the world is impossible if man cannot see in the world any problem that he cannot solve by himself. This may be a sweeping declaration but it is in reasonable accord with Christian theology of the broad middle position.

In order for the homiletical vocabulary to strike man
where he is, the nature of man's predicament and the religious
necessity arising from that predicament must be understood.
The crisis arises within the world-pattern which the crowd
forms and in the light of which it interprets its experience.
Oswald Spengler finds that the great world-patterns of history
can be classified according to spacial symbols. The classical
culture of the Hellenic age, he typifies in the nude statue,
complete in itself as its blind eyeballs testify thru their
refusal to establish communication with the beholder. The
temple of Greece, he styles as "hovering". Its external row
of pillars stop the beholder. It is, and that is sufficient
for the classical culture.

The Egyptian concept of extension was the ordered way.
Their temples, he calls "enclosed paths." From the river
to the sphinx ran a series of courts along a perfectly
straight path. The Egyptian pictures march on the wall and
spiral around the pillar, all going the same way. Chinese
culture expresses itself also in terms of the pathway
but the Chinese path is wandering. The temple is a park
with scattered buildings. The path wanders about with
turnings and surprises and glimpses of beauty but there is
no apparent beginning or end.

He styles the culture of the near east "Magian." Its
idea of extension is the cave, enclosed and complete.
It is the world of the cyclic, of the struggle of good
and evil, between them creating the whole of reality.

The West, Spengler believes, is man's greatest manifestation
of his will to power.  The tragedy of the West is Faustian
in its self-destruction thru its own will to power.  Because
of its infinite will, the West sees extension as boundless.
space.  Spengler interprets the great Gothic cathedrals
as representing the idea of boundless space.  The cathedral
is not to be seen from the outside like the Greek temple.
It is not a roofed-in cave like the Magian Sancta Sophia.
The Gothic cathedral is properly seen from the inside.
In the midst of such a cathedral, man seems to see space
soaring away from him, high into the vaultings.  Between the
Magian world of Jesus and the Faustian world of Christendom,
there is this religious difference:  the Magian grace came
down as substance, the Faustian grace unbinds the will.[1]

The importance of Spengler's intuition is not in the
exactness of the images he has selected as representative
of the form-languages, but in his notion  that there are
form-languages which arise as the media  of expression for
the cultures.  LeBon has the same insight when he speaks of
the crowd creating its language as an instrument of its own
self-expression.  The point is illustrated by Santayana
when he discusses the view of the world that would be posessed
by a people who had no nouns in their language.  It is this

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1.  Oswald Spengler The Decline of the West  N. Y. Alfred A.
                    Knopf, 1932.  The thought summarized here
                    is integral to the entire work which seeks
                    to demonstrate the necessary end of the
                    culture of the West in terms of the life-
                    cycle of other cultures and of its own
                    world-view.

relation of language to culture that makes the philosophical
study of grammar almost a metaphysical study, Santayana
declares. Within the categories of speech are the categories
of value accepted by the race using that speech. That is
why he believes poetic speech cannot be translated; the
language of translation has nothing of the timbre and few
of the metaphysical presuppositions of the original tongue.[1]

The interrelation of speech and culture is so intimate
that it is difficult to state exactly which is the prior
influence. Philosophy of history tends to become a variant
of the "chicken-or-the-egg" controversy. The primal urges
of the group form the language of the group and find their
expression of that language. The language, in turn, creates
the thought and behavior patterns of the group and determines
the nature of the crisis of the group. Within the particular
crisis, as it appears at a given moment in history, is the
language of that crisis. This language is the language which
must be used to communicate the religious solution of that
crisis. It is the vehicle for the homiletic message of
salvation. If the culture is the sea, the form-language is
the tide and the crisis is the particular wave that threatens
the boat. The nature of each determines the other and determines
the means which will be valid in dealing with the predicament
of the moment. The lore of seamanship, knowledge of the
tides and currents of the sea that the boat is navigating
and the look of the immediate threat all converge to
indicate the means of meeting the threat.

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1. George Santayana The Sense of Beauty N.Y. Charles Scribner's
                        Sons, 1936, pp. 127ff.

The examination of the theories of two philosophers and
a theologian, Spengler, Sorokin and Niebuhr, should present
a workable chart of the crisis of our time.  These charts
may be "myth", in the sense in which this thesis seeks to
elaborate a theory of myth.  That does not hinder their
usefulness nor the creation of other myths on the same subject.
So long as they posess the internal validity of myth,
workabitity and correspondence with experience, they are
practical working diagrams of the crisis.

Spengler constructs an anatomy of the will to power which
arises from the nature of man as a beast of prey.[1]  Like
LeBon, he believes that there is a primal quality that forms
the whole of the species and determines the nature of its
aspiration and its expression.  Animal species are not to
be judged by the nature of their structure but by the nature
of their soul.  Man, as an animal of prey, belongs to the
highest form of mobile life.  He posesses the will to power
and, being clever, he is able to implement that will thru
technics.  The first technic to emerge is language, specifically
the language of command.  By language, man achieved the power
of collective doing but, in order to partake of this collective
power, man had to submerge his individual ego and lost the
ability to seek satisfaction for his own will to power.  The
individual ego must seek its triumph in the corporate power.
Technics are devised to assert the collective will.  The

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1. <u>Man and Technics</u> N. Y. Alfred A. Knopf 1932 p. 19

greatest technic is the "trick of the machine" which is the
use of the strength of nature to overcome nature.  By this
trick, which includes organizational technics as well as
mechanics, man has been able to assert the freedom of his
own will and attain to higher and higher manifestations of
power over nature.  But this act of rebellion is doomed to
failure for "nature is the strongest of the two."[1] The nature
of man's destruction is determined by the nature of his
endeavor.

All cultures assert the will to power, Spengler declares,
but the West has reached the highest point of that assertion.
It is "probably" not the last of man's cultures but it is
the most powerful of all and, in its power, the most tragic.
The tragedy comes from the profound spiritual disharmony
within the culture, styled by Spengler as the contest between
priest and noble, truth and life.  It is the war between
intellect and destiny which must eventually destroy the
culture.[2]

Spengler divides the history of cultures into "culture,"
"civilization," and "the final hardening."  For the West,
the last stage has set in.  The springtime of the West was
the Carolingian age.  The Gothic was natural growth in which
life found its expression simply and religiously for man still

1. Op. Cit. p. 30
2. Ibid. p. 78

had his roots in the soil. The Faustian soul found its
natural expression in the great Gothic myth of the Devil
and the sense of doom. "Every man lived in those days in
the consciousness of an immense danger, and it was hell,
not the hangman, that he feared."[1]  The Faustian soul
saw itself poetically as an ego lost in infinite space, an
ego that was all force and will but confronted with an
immeasurably greater force and will. Spengler sees the
whole sacramental dogma of the schoolmen as the unbinding
of the will thru grace.

The Reformation marked the end of the culture period and
the beginning of civilization.[2] The reformers were city men,
root-cut and remote from "God-perfused nature" outside of the
city wall. The Reformation and its puritanism was the only
contribution that the city could make to religion. The
cities and civilization are as profoundly irreligious as
cultures are profoundly religious. Within itself the Reformation
held the seeds of rationalism. It dissolved the sensible
quality of the Gothic myth and left the bare bones of reason.
"This is the step from Cromwell to Hume."

The city itself is the fruit and the decay of culture.
The city brings to bloom the finest flower that the culture
conceives and then crystalizes that flower into a set form.
The end is not so much decay as stagnation. The Chinese and

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1. Decline of the West vol. II, p. 290

2. Ibid. p. 302

Magian cultures have existed to this day virtually unchanged
in their set forms. Nothing new is produced. The city
is unfruitful biologically, mentally and artistically.[1]
The basis of the civilized order becomes, not the soil nor
the people who have their roots in the soil but the "fluid
megalopolitan populace, the rootless city-mass..." The
old culture-myths cease to have any force. The pagani
remain outside the city wall, in the backwoods where ideas
do not penetrate.

It is clear that Spengler expects for the Faustian world,
not the crystalization and endless dragging on of the Chinese
and Magian cultures, not the extinction from without which
was Egypt's fate, but a final catastrophe that wells from the
very foundation of the Faustian soul to involve the world
in ruin. He finds that the corporate strength of man is the
implementation of the will by language. The language of command
that gives man the power of organization, leads to the separation
of "Hands" and "Brain." In the simple tasks of the early
cultures, the "Hands" can understand the nature of what the
"Brain" commands but, as technics progress, the involved and
intricate machinery of human organization, the esoteric arcana
of economics and trade, are beyond the understanding of
those who do the bidding of the leaders. They feel that the
whole order of human society rests upon them because they are
cogs in a machine that could not function without cogs.

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1. Op. Cit. pp. 358ff

The "Hands" revolt against the system of which they are
a part but their assertion of their will to power is their
destruction. Without the skilled technical direction of
the "Brain", they lack means of subsistence and their
numbers are their doom.[1]  "All great cultures are defeats,"
is Spengler's premise. His only hope is that the west
may go down in a riot of ruin fitting to the most powerful
culture of all time.

Although Spengler finds the same pattern of growth and
crystalization in all the great cultures, his theory is
not one of cycles but of the autonomous behavior of parallel
cultures according to the laws of destiny. A cyclical
theory of cultures and crises is developed by Pitirim
Sorokin. He finds a complete circuit of values from the
"ideational" to the "sensate" and back again by way of the
"idealistic." The current crisis is the time of confusion
between the "dying sensate culture of our magnificent yesterday
and the coming ideational culture of the creative tomorrow."[2]

The medieval culture, he finds, was super-sensory, holding
that all reality and value was centered in God. This
culture-form, he calls "ideational." Opposed to ideational
culture is the thinking that has marked our nearer past, that
all reality and value is contained in sensed objects only.
This major premise, "the sensory nature of the true reality
and value", has shaped what Korzybski calls the "neuro-

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1. Man and Technics p. 99

2. The Crisis of Our Age N.Y., E. P. Dutton and Co. 1942
   p. 13, quoting from his own Social and Cultural Dynamics.

semantic" reactions of man into the pattern of sensate
culture.  This culture has been responsible for splendid
achievements but it is drawing to its close.

Sorokin does not attempt to evaluate the two types of
culture.  He merely hold that there are two types, that
they follow one another in cyclic sequence and that the
destruction of each culture is determined by its own first
principles.  Unfortunately for the peace of man, they do not
flow evenly into one another.  As Walter Lippmann remarks,
"The disharmonies of this uneven evolution (of events in
time) are the problems of mankind."[1]

These are the symptoms of decay which Sorokin finds in
any period of cultural decline:

> When any socio-cultural system enters the stage of
> its disintegration, the following four symptoms of
> the disintegration appear and grow in it:  first,
> the inner self-contradictions of an irreconcilable
> dualism in such a culture; second, its formlessness--
> a chaotic syncretism of undigested elements taken from
> different cultures; third a quantitative colossalism--
> mere size and quantity at the cost of quality; and
> fourth, a progressive exhaustion of its creativeness
> in the field of great and perennial values.[2]

The close agreement of this analysis with that of Spengler,
as exhibited in the table at the conclusion of the first
volume of The Decline of the West, is remarkable.  The two
thinkers differ sharply, however, in their analysis of the

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1. Walter Lippmann The Phantom Public N.Y. Harcourt, Brace
                     & Co. 1925 p. 84

2. The Crisis of Our Age p. 241

form-language of culture and that difference emerges in
the radical difference of their conclusions.  Sorokin
believes that machines and technical devices will survive
from the present sensate culture into the coming ideational
culture.  Spengler feels that the machine is a creation of
the West and will die with the West because it must be alien
to any other culture.  Thus, to Spengler, each culture is
complete in itself and cannot pass on its true heritage.
Sorokin's cycle, on the other hand, is cumulative.  The
spiral of ascent may not be steady but, to shift to Macaulay's
image, tho a single wave may recede, the tide is evidently
coming in.  The period of transition is a lower point that
that represented by either the culture that precedes or
that which follows it.  In the period of change, the sensate
culture displays "all the signs of creative exhaustion and
a mania for self-destruction", the purely mechanistic, brutal
hedonism of extreme materialism are mingled with an awakening
of the ideational values of absolute ethical norms.[1]

An apostle of such absolute ethical norms is America's
outstanding "crisis theologian", Reinhold Niebuhr.  He
agrees with both Spengler and Sorokin that man's predicament
in the context of history finds its source in man's own
nature.  With Spengler, he finds the root of the destruction
in finite man's will to power.  The expression of that will
is man's insistence on the finality of what is really only

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1. Op. Cit. p. 301

transient, a refusal to recognize the limitations of his
view in the momentary context of history. Man is finite
and yet free, says Niebuhr. This is the starting point of
most religions. But if this insight is accepted as the basic
datum of religion, salvation becomes a salvation from history.
The religious techniques are directed toward refining from
man's nature the free and eternal qualities and discarding
the dross of finitude. In a non-religious philosophy, such
as Spengler's, it leads to an acceptance and glorification of
the tragedy.

Christianity, as Niebuhr interprets its insights, recognizes
that man is finite and free but Christianity does not take
the step of declaring that the created world is evil. This
he finds expressed in the dogma of the resurrection of the
body. What is important in Christianity is not the dichotomy
of body and spirit but that man is self-transcendent. By
self-transcendence, he means the ability to stand outside
of himself and survey his own acts and even to observe himself
surveying himself. Another term is "self-consciousness."
This, and not freedom of will, is to Niebuhr the way in which
man is made in the image of God.

Man's tragedy, then, is not his finitude but his sin.
His consciousness of self, whereby he is of the image of God,
is the source of his fall because, thru it, he asserts his
will against the will of God. The tragedy is complete when
this same characteristic is the means whereby he recognizes
himself as sinner. He is able to recognize that the evil

in his life arises from his transgression against the will
of God. His self-transcendent nature means that his sin
is always the sin of pride. The disparity between the
potential and the actual, between the will of God and man's
will, is the source of the inevitable tragedy in the life
of man.

The agreement between these three thinkers on history is
the essence of "crisis" as used in this thesis. They agree
that man's predicament arises from his own nature and is thus
inevitable. Spengler is willing to accept that tragedy in
a kind of noble death-seeking. Sorokin sees the predicament
of man simple a change in the terms upon which the culture
is based. Niebuhr, alone of the three, finds a religious
solution to the crisis. God, working in history, fulfills man's
effort in the realms beyond history. Niebuhr's theology
is a myth of integration created in terms of historical
Christian formulations.[1] The important elements of the
religious solution are the recognition of a crisis in terms
of man's predicament in his context of history, the solution
of the crisis in terms of a superior integration which is
stated in mythical terms. It is this final statement with
which the homiletical vocabulary is concerned but the crisis
and the terms of its recognition condition the formulation
of the statement.

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1. This analysis is based both on the reading of Niebuhr
   and upon his Earl foundation lectures.

Not all philosophers of history see history as a grand
tragedy or as the necessary behavior of man within his
culture pattern. Other philosophers see the crisis as
a problem which may be solved exactly as any other problem.
They are committed to the possibility, if not the inevitability,
of progress.

J. H. Randall in his The Spirit of the New Philosophy[1]
draws direct issue with the pessimists. "It is inconceivable
that the world should ever go back to what it was in 1914.
It is impossible that it should remain in its present disordered
and chaotic state. There is only one way left open,--it
must go forward to higher and better things."[2]

Writing at the close of World War I, he felt that
"regardless of its beginnings, this has been the people's
war."[3] He found a spirit of revolt abroad in the world,
a time, he was sure, of God's great hour thru man. Looking
back on the war, he saw that the allies had attained a
greater unity than would ever before have been thought
possible. There was a new spirit abroad in the world and
that spirit would bring forth "new and nobler leaders"
when the time was ripe.

Ahead was a new unity, not of uniformity, but of organism.
The organic unity was to have been of the spirit, not merely

1. Lon. William Rider and Son. 1919

2. Ibid. p. vii

3. Ibid. p. 31

political, and would have involved a new discovery of God
and a union of the divine within the individual with the
divine in every other individual in the world.

This is a religious solution which imposes a pattern of
unity somewhat in the Stoic tradition. Silas Bent sees man's
difficulty simply as a problem in organization which calls
neither for the intervention of God nor of the religious
sentiment. He poses the question in simple form: "Are we
all, in a word, to become the servants and victims of the
machine, or shall we be its masters and beneficiaries?"[1]
So long as the machine is made an end in itself, he proceeds,
its force shall be destructive. Used properly, the machine
is a guarantee against those forces of destruction which
have operated in more primitive economies. The immense
potentialities of power are scarcely opened to us. "We
rejoice that the engineer of a ship, by moving a lever,
can loose fifty thousand horse power..."[2] All that remains
is the problem of humanising these fifty-thousand horses
which, admittedly, are quite as ready to destroy man as
to serve him. To Bent, this is both possible and probable.
Perhaps the machine age lacks some of the values of its
predecessors but the next generation shall master the evils
of the machine and enter upon a new life of greater richness
and fullness.[3]

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1. Machine Made Man N.Y. Farrar and Rinehart, 1930, p. xvi
2. Ibid. p. 2
3. Ibid. p. 17

For the west to solve its problems on a material plane seems right and fitting to Bent. The realm of the material is the West's proper sphere of thought and action. He quotes Dr. Hu Shih who declares that the Western mastery of matter is the spiritualization of matter with the result that the masses of the West share in the more abundant life.[1] Thus the Western resolution of man's predicament must be in terms of technics since these technics represent the best that the West has to offer.

According to one writer, the church is not one of those technics. J. H. Denison writes on the basis of a family relationship theory of culture. The emotions create a sense of unity within the social group of either a patriarchal or a fratriarchal type. In 1928 he saw in the world a growing sense of brotherliness that made patriarchal emotional ties unnecessary to the good government of the world. Therefore there was no longer the need for the church in its role as the ceremonial means of developing "a sense of unity of the vertical or patriarchal type."[1] This was unfortunate, he felt, because the early insight of the church into the concept of the Holy Spirit was "fratriarchal." But the church had allowed itself to be drawn into a patriarchal culture and so had lost the effectiveness of this doctrine. Denison

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1. Op. Cit. p. 13
2. Emotion as the Basis of Civilization N.Y., Lon. 1928, p. 469

felt that he saw the re-emergence of the fratriarchal concept
in the social religion of the day but it was his opinion that
the "tri-churchism" of Protestants, Catholics and Jews would
prevent the church from functioning effectively as an instrument
for the development of a fratriarchal emotional culture.

The same notion of a religious unification of the diversities
of life is developed by Charles Whitney Gilkey.  In a recent
article he points out the danger of not being prepared to make
peace when the time comes[1]  Religion, he declares, gives us
courage to face the problems of life but for religion to be
of aid in facing post-war reconstruction, the churches must
have the same view.  He hopes for an ecumenical church which
may be ready to deal with the issues when the opportunity arises.
In any event, the church must be ready to awaken a sense
of penitence and to contribute a realization of the unities.

All these philosophers are creating their own myths of
history.  All are more or less helpful in the proportion that
their myths have more or less correspondence with experience.
It is interesting that each attempts to find some sort of unity
which, superimposed upon the many diverse patterns of history,
make them meaningful in relation to a single pattern.  All
of them sense in man's predicament in the context of history
the key to a unity which will make both the context and the
predicament significant.

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1. "Anticipating the Post-War Mind", Religion and the Present
   Crisis John Knox, ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago
   Press, 1942

Whether or no the formal phrasing of the Christian message be that of "crisis theology", it cannot well be communicated unless there is a sense of "crisis" within the group to which the message is directed. Niebuhr declares that the religious need arises from a profound dissatisfaction with man's own highest moral values.[1] The preliminary task of preaching, then, is the clarification of the nature of the difficulty. The hell-fire sermons of the past were sound psychologically. They pointed up this dissatisfaction by making it appallingly clear and so prepared the ground for the Christian solution. The myth of the crisis must be made real before the myths of salvation are acceptable. In terms of recent history, Belgium, not convinced of her crisis, refused allied help until it was too late.

The crisis is not only psychologically prior to salvation but the myth of the particular crisis is syntactically prior to the symbols which will enter into the homiletic myth of salvation.

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1. <u>Beyond Tragedy</u> N. Y. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937 p. 28

## The Religious Necessity

One must be in danger before one may be saved. Religiously, the Devil is necessary to salvation. The bulk of the preceding chapter aimed at the presentation of both religious and non-religious formulations of humanity's experience of the Devil. The reasonings of historical philosophers and the intuitions of tragic dramatists have pointed toward a current of dissolution in human life, the existence of something that is about its work of disintegration within the very striving of mankind. Shallow thought and shallow intuition identify the Devil with the immediate frustration; Hitler, the Capitalists, the Gossips, the System. The profound sense of tragedy arises with the recognition of the seeds of disintegration deep within man's own nature.

The current of dissolution seems to be working so deeply within the universe that theologians have placed it very close to Divinity. The absolute dualism of the Magian world and the Yang-and-Yin of Korea made it a counter-principle on the same level as the first creative principle. Other theologies, while maintaining the supreme power and majesty of God, nevertheless give the power of evil strength just short of God's strength and infinitely above the strength of man. One school of modern thought makes the negative power a "given" quality in God Himself or, at least, an area of reality where even God is powerless.[1]

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1. E.g., Edgar Brightman, John C. Bennett

The tragic intuition has always been that the efforts
of man are always destroyed by what is strongest in man.
As Niebuhr states it in his essay, the towers of Babel are
always destroyed by their first principles.[1]   The literary
tragedy of the old order was not the sordid story of futility
but rather that of the downfall of some noble character thru
his very quality of nobility.  Because Hamlet is sensitive,
he is indecisive.  If his character were of another order, his
tragedy would be different.

The tragic situation in itself is not the source of religious
need.  The crisis must first be understood religiously.  The
nature of the crisis must be analysed beyond surface appearances.
A crisis that has a solution within the range of man's ability
is not a religious crisis.  The true nature must be probed
to the depths where the crisis is seen as fundamentally arising in
the nature of man and beyond anything that he may do to
heal its disease.  The crisis may be seen with Spengler as
the West's "inward conflict between its comprehensive intellectuality
and its profound spiritual disharmony"[2] or phrased religiously
as "Human decisions are profoundly disturbed by the terribly
serious question whether they conform to the will of God."[3]
Once the crisis is felt in its depth, the way is open to the
religious solution.

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1. Beyond Tragedy "The Tower of Babel."

2. Man and Technics p. 78

3. Religion and the Present Crisis, "Redeeming Culture Through
   Crisis" by William Pauck, p. 146

The crisis has no meaning beyond itself.  The dissolution
is not significant.  The heart-ache of the tragedy arises
from its futility.  Man is sure that it is not necessary that
he should, for example, periodically murder his fellow men.
Yet he is conscious that he is caught in a whirl of events
that sooner or later marches him off, equipped with the best
weapons that his mind can devise, to do just that.  It is
this inherent _meaningless_ that has led to the religious intuition
that the Devil cannot be the ultimate victor.

The religious solution to the crisis must involve the
presentation of a meaningful world picture that imposes a
transcendent unity upon the divisive patterns of appearances.
The presentation of such a picture in itself is not enough.
Non-religious pictures may be presented that are significant
but hopeless.  The religious presentation must demonstrate
the workings of salvation.  The force of integration must be
accepted as more powerful that the force of disintegration.
This is what is done by each religion, however it may apprehend
the continued crisis of mankind and whatever may be its path
toward salvation.

Religion is not primarily concerned with explaining the
physical universe.  Religion thinks in terms of life and
so prefers to make the moral world meaningful.  That is the
world in which man, of all the created world, lives alone.
That is the world in which he has his great difficulties.
It is the only world in which he experiences tragedy.  If
that world lacks meaning for him, then all the world lacks meaning.

When the world in which man lives is made morally meaningful
in terms of a transcendent resolution of the disharmonies
that he experiences, man has a religion. Mankind has incorporated
its experiences of such a realm of meaning and value into all
its great religions. Thus the meaningful world-view is already
in existence in the record of man's experience of it. It is
the task of preaching to communicate this recorded experience
to men of a particular age in terms meaningful to them.

To say that man is of a particular age and place is to
say that he is in the field of influence of a number of
intersecting lines of history. The intersection is his own
crisis and determines how the religious experience of the
race must be re-presented to him if its world-view is to
carry any significance for him. It is obvious that a missionary
in order to preach to the heathen must first learn the language
of the heathen. What some missionaries have failed to realize
is that the language is not purely verbal but an ingrained
way of thinking. In learning the words but not the thoughts,
missionaries have been responsible for some tragic misapprehensions
of Christianity. Chinese bandits have listened gladly to the
story of the crucifixion and learned from it only a new method
of torture. Other Chinese have interpreted the Christian story
into the idiom as well as the language of China and have so
prepared the way for Christianity to become part of the life
of the people. Or again, E. Stanley Jones points out that the
Christ accepted in India is not the Christ of the West.

The crisis of mankind does not change from age to age. This is an essential insight of all religions. The formulation of the predicament of man does, however, vary with time and place and from group to group within society. Thus the formulation of the message of salvation must be changed but the message itself remains based upon the experience of the race as embodied in its great historical religions.

The experience of Hebrew-Christian tradition is the most vital of all these religions. While it is not the intention of this thesis to develop a theology appropriate to the current historical situation of the West, a brief review of the outstanding doctrines within the West's great religious tradition should be part of a work aimed at indicating a methodology whereby the insights of this tradition may be made available to men caught in the crisis of our age. The prime consideration of the Hebrew-Christian tradition is that there is a personal God who cares for man. This consideration in itself gives meaning to history. No matter whether God is able to save man or not, the belief and trust in a personal God who at least cares what happens to man is a meaningful world-view.

The Christian doctrines which are of major importance are elaborations and implementations of this primary insight. God is prior to all else. All things which are not God are God's creatures. As creator, God is all powerful. Because he cares, his hand is active in history. Therefore, it is

in history that the Christian story takes place and the
Christian religion is justified.  The Christian story is
of God in history, God made man and come among us.  From
the incarnation, follows its purpose, the redemption of
mankind.  The redemption is Christianity's message of
salvation.  Thru the redeeming death of Christ on the cross,
man is saved from that within him that works toward his
disintegration, that tends, in Augustine's phrase, to return
him to nothingness whence he came.  The currents are reversed
by the grace that comes thru Christ and the redeemed man
moves toward integration by which he takes his place in
God's creative world order.  This is "eternal life" which
has had many phrasings, ranging from the Greek contemplation
and knowledge of God to Aquinas' "Vision of God" and to
such varied concepts as the resurrection of the righteous
on the last day and the social doctrine of the imortalization
of the individual thru his useful work in society.

All phrasings of the theology behind doctrines must have
the validity of correspondence with human experience.  This
has been true in all effective formulations.  None of them
contain within themselves complete truth but all accord with
experience and each is especially fitted for acceptance and
operation within the life of man at the time that it is
formulated.  The homiletic task is the seeking out of such
formulations so that the truth of Christian insights may
be brought to bear upon the momentary crisis.  The preacher

has the task of convincing.  To convince, he must communicate.
To communicate, he must use the language of the time.
His message, he feels, is the solution of the great problem
of the trend to disintegration within the life of man.  He
must, to make it effective in contemporary life, fit it to
the contemporary understanding of the basic problem, to
its contemporary formulation in the world.

## How Man Is Moved

The church, as propagandist, has one purpose, the salvation
of man. In this purpose, she has no techniques available,
hardly excepting even those of secramental character, which
are not available to any other propagandist. Men are the
same, whether the angels or the devils seek to bend them to
their purpose. "Before anything can be 'effective' men
must be persuaded that it is of vital interest to them, and
if they are to be persuaded the customary means of persuasion
must be used."[1] The "customary means of persuasion" are among
the immemorial techniques of mankind. The church has used
them as well as the politicians. The church gave them their
present name, "propaganda", and now the church tends to reject
them because the word bears such malororous freight. It is
necessary for us to consider here these techniques of control
because the effectiveness of our homiletic formulations depends
largely upon their accord with the usual means of moving mankind.

If the Devil, in man's religious experience, has always
been the currents of disintegration which he has perceived in
his own being, salvation depends upon setting up counter
currents of meaning and integration. The means of propaganda
must be directed toward convincing man of the truth of
historical religious insights which affirm that history
is meaningful. What Walpole calls the semantic "ghosts"[2],

1. W. Fraser Mitchell English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes
        to Tillotson N.Y. and Lon., S.P.C.K. 1932 p. 47

2. Hugh Walpole Semantics N.Y. W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1941
        p. 175

those words which hypostatize abstract values. It is not
necessary to maintain these values in the realm of abstraction,
but it is necessary to assert them in the realm of the
concrete as elements which are indispensable to the full
life of man.

But even this is not enough. The church's propaganda
must be directed at securing from men "absolute commitment
to a depth of creative good which they can never fully
understand..."[1] This is the surrender to the will of God
that the church has always sought. The absolute commitment,
traditional theology asserts, comes only by the grace of God.
Nevertheless, it is the obligation of the church's propaganda
to seek that commitment among men, just as each Christian
should seek it in his life. Propaganda cannot control
grace. It may hope for grace as it proceeds with its own,
man-made techniques. Its purpose is to give to men an
adequate and meaningful world-view and this cannot be done
religiously without recognition of values nor the commitment
to a source of meaning and value.

The method of preaching is the method of communication with
the group. So much time has so far been spent on the character
and context of the group because, simply and inevitably,
"No idea or opinion is an isolated factor. It is surrounded
and influenced by precedent, authority, habit and all the

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1. Henry Nelson Wieman Now We Must Choose N.Y., The Macmillan
                        Co. 1941, p. 240

other human motivations."[1]  Within the group, the individual

obtains the release of his deepest feelings but the crowd

conditions the means of his expression.  He does that of

which the group approves and his personal aspirations and

fears are equally determined by the group.

In searching out the semantic psychology that underlies

the public appeal of preaching, the total environment of

the group of auditors, which is to say, their historical

orientation, is an elemental condition of the vocabulary,

both of words and ideas, which is to be used.  The history

and the aspirations of the social organism is the total

environment.  Within the pattern thus set, modern public

opinion methods have created other crowds, other currents

of opinion.  These crowds are not determined for the same

purpose.  Some are created by the advertising methods of

modern industry, others by the cruder methods available to the

political organizations.  It is a primary tenet of this thesis

that individuals must be met in the crowds to which they

belong and appealed to in terms of the catchwords of the

dominant crowd

Bernays points out that "There is no means of human

communication which may not also be a means of deliberate

propaganda, because propaganda is simply the establishment

of reciprocal understanding between an individual and a group."[2]

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1. Edward L. Bernays Crystalizing.Public Opinion N.Y. 1934
                      p. 97

2. Ibid. p. 150

And to deal with the group, it is necessary to recognize
that its mental characteristics are neither the sum nor the
average of the individual but something totally new and more
elemental.[1]

One element, at least, in this new factor that emerges
with the formation of a crowd, is the cumulative effect of a
variety of stimuli, the meeting and the unity of purpose
and thought of a number of people which discourages clear
thinking, as does any excitement.[2] While this element is
probably not the deepest--it can hardly be said to exist
when the crowd is composed of widely separated individuals
reading an advertisement--it is the most readily utilized
by a speaker dealing with a group.

Adolf Hitler, who has had some success in these lines,
recognizes the existence of a contest between the speaker and
the group and utilizes any means that comes to hand for the
overcoming of the group's resistance. "All these cases,"
he writes in Mein Kampf, "Involve encroachments upon men's
freedom of will...In the evening...they succumb more easily
to the dominating force of a stronger will."[3] The same
principle applies to other types of atmosphere. Not only
will the same speech and the same speaker have varying success
at different times of the day but also in different settings.

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1. Op. Cit. p. 47

2. Merl E. Bonney Techniques of Appeal and Social Control
                 N.Y., Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis,
                 1934, p. 362

3. Op. Cit. p. 710

This principle is demonstrated in the annual rally in the Munich
Rathhauskeller or, as he cites himself, "a performance of
'Parsifal at Bayreuth."[1]   Again he cites, probably from his
own youthful experience, "the artificially created yet mysterious
dusk of the Catholic churches, the burning candles, incense,
censers, etc."[2]

Again it must be pointed out that propaganda does not
exist in a vacuum.  The techniques of control cannot be
exercised unless the opposition is known.  C. S. Gardner
points out that the mind accepts everything presented to
it unless there already exists in "the experience or organization
of the mind" which presents opposition.[3]  Hitler, thinking
in terms of sentiment, declares that the most effective
opposition is counter-sentiment.[4]  It is effective simply
because it already occupies the ground where propaganda seeks
to operate.  To circumvent this opposition, the propagandist
must adopt the policy of expediency.   "If you can't fight
'em, jine 'em."  That is, he must seek to manipulate the
sentiments already present.  The linkage is accomplished as
a rule by words that seem to demonstrate that the situation
upon which the subject already has a fixed opinion is exactly
the situation which exists in the given instance.  Thus the

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1. Op. Cit. p. 709

2. Ibid. p. 711

3. Psychology and Preaching N.Y., Macmillan Co., 1918, p. 135

4. Op. Cit. p. 704

already existing sentiment is attached to the object of the
propaganda.  That this can be done is the result of the nature
of language whereby a word in context is freighted as a rule
with far more emotion than precision.

This fact was noted by Bishop Berkeley:

> When language is once grown familiar the hearing of the
> sounds or sight of the characters is often immediately
> attended with those passions which at first were wont
> to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are
> now quite omitted.[1]

Ogden adds that thus metaphysical reasoning acquires
emotive significance.  That this emotive significance is a
virtual requirement of language seems to be indicated in
the resistance outside of technical circles to the introduction
of coined words.

But the emotional freight is not an element introduced
at will.  It already exists and must be taken into account.
Burnham, interested in determining the ideological scheme
which shall buttress his "managerial revolution" points out
that "Arguments about ideologies can, and do, continue as
long as the interests embodied by them are felt to be of
any significance,"[2] which is to say that their appeal continues
so long as they seem to meet a need.  On this principle, he
finds, concerning the ruling class ideologies:

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1.    Quoted by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards _The Meaning of_
      _Meaning_ N.Y., Harcourt, Brace and Co. Inc., 1923 p. 92

2.    James Burnham _The Managerial Revolution_ N.Y. The John
                   Day Company, Inc., p. 186

> (1) They must actually express, at least roughly, the
> social interests of the ruling class in question, and
> must aid in creating a pattern of thought and feeling
> favorable to the maintainance of the key institutions
> and relations of the given social structure. (2) They
> must at the same time be so expressed as to be capable
> of appealing to the sentiments of the masses...The
> ideology must ostensibly speak in the name of "humanity,"
> "the people," "the race," "the future," "God,"
> "destiny," and so on...A successful ideology has got
> to seem to the masses, in however confused a way,
> actually to express some of their own interests.[1]

Interesting examples of the use of this appeal in a negative

manner is the utilization of the essential prudishness of

the crowd (LeBon points out its existence even among rakes

and wastrels when they compose a theatre audience) by making

the charge that the Church of England came into existence simply

to implement the lusts of Henry VIII and that the Reformation

in Germany was brought about by an Augustinian monk who wanted

to marry a nun.  This simple pasting of labels allows the

crowd to incorporate a new idea neatly into an old system

without so much as stirring the surface of the current.  The

labels that are available are the common property of all

propaganda.  Martin speaks of such words as "justice" as

the greatest common denominator of crowd feeling when they

are used only in the sense of those elements represented by

the word which are within the experience of everyone in the

crowd.[2] It seems to me a significant commentary on the essential

high-mindedness of society that the words which move it are

the words which stand for great ideals.

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1. Op.Cit. p. 186

2. Everett Dean Martin The Behavior of Crowds N.Y., Harper and
                        Bros. 1920 p. 28

In Burnham's brief list of emotive words available for
bolstering up a ruling class ideology it will be noted that
the words embody the deeply felt desires of the group. In
Lasswell's phrase, they are "plus-words". Martin remarks
on the notable similarity between the revolutionary idealisms
which have embodied the social needs of the crowd in all
ages.[1] Bonney classifies these needs under four headings, the
desire for security, for new experience, recognition and
response.[2] In his table of contents, the largest number of
techniques is listed under the first head. These consist
of identifiying oneself with the people in their need,
appealing when resistance is low,[3] obtaining the desired
reaction by teaching the group to expect that reaction (much
religious experience is certainly of this type), appealing
to fear, particularly unknown and indefinable fears ("your
best friend won't tell you.") New experience is simply
enough given because the meeting, the speaker and all the
paraphernalia, particularly if sufficiently dramatic, are in
themselves new experiences. This can be extended by enabling
the group to take part in the marching, singing, and similar
activities. Gifts of position and of recognition are useful
means of social control. Hitler was able to make use of
Germanic fondness for uniforms and rank by creating his S.A.
batallions. American Sunday Schools award pins and American
advertisers start their copy, "They laughed when I spoke to
the waiter in French..."

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1. Op. Cit. p. 200

2. Op. Cit. (table of contents.)

3. cf. Hitler, supra.

The fourth classification, the desire for response, is
an important aspect of man's religious necessity.  It means
that the world-view, to be truly satisfactory, must be one
in which there is personal response to man's need.  Bonney
writes:  "Religous faith and participation in religious causes
give people a greater sense of personal significance."[1]

Concluding his book with a section on the presentation of
ideas, Bonney asserts that they should be clear and concrete
to the point of over-simplification.  Burnham's list was an
over-simplification of the managerial purpose thru the use
of emotive words.  Another form is that of personalization.

> The Devil has been used to advantage by religious
> leaders for many centuries.  He has been used to personify
> "evil" in the world, and thus to make the object of
> Christian endeavor more definite and concrete, namely
> to eliminate the Devil and all his works from human
> affairs.[2]

Every propaganda movement follows this technique.  It
is much easier to say interesting things about the Devil
than it is to say interesting things about virtue.  "The
descriptions of the torments of hell are longer and of a
more vivid quality than those of heaven," says John Sala
in his discussion of Anglo-Saxon preaching.[3]

Hypostatization is the technique of realization into which
the mind of man most readily falls.  Even the most abstract
of ideas is dealt with in terms of analogy.  When the idea

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1. Op. Cit. p. 305

2. Ibid. p. 352

3. Preaching in the Anglo-Saxon Church Chicago, University of
Chicago press, Private edition, 1934 p. 116

becomes emotionally significant, the analogy readily becomes
a reality, hence the early Christian debates over the exact
structure of the triple throne of the Trinity. In the
middle ages, such hypostatization was other worldly. It
felt that nothing had its meaning exhausted in the phenomenal
world but that everything reached in essence into the next
world. The medieval mind bridged the gap between the two
worlds by mental association which set up the idea of "an
essential and mystic connection."[1] In the modern world,
the difference is that the connection is material and not
mystical. The Devil is no longer a dangerous monster from
another world. He is found in such fictions as "War Mongers,"
"Merchants of Death" and similar shadowy figures moving upon
the international scene.

The religious sentiment of America is often conveniently
expressed by a single word, representing a single value.
Such a value is "peace" which, with its opposite, "war" has
often become hypostatized. "War" has been thought of as
something that "happened" (a foggy word) and supplanted "peace."
Characteristically, "war" was pictured and dwelt upon much
more than "peace", just as the early New England Calvinists
were helped far more along the road to salvation by considering
the Devil than by considering God. In the case of "war",
an identification seems to have been made with "Hitler" (quoted
because the word, in all its meanings had no reference to any

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1. Homer G. Pfander *The Popular Sermon of the Medieval Friar
                     in England*  New York University Ph.D. thesis,
                     1937, p. 14

person or persons, living or dead.)  The conflict came for
the pacifists when fighting began and they discovered that
those who were most actively against "Hitler" were by their
active opposition involved in "war."  John Knox declares
that, in his opinion, about half of the most influential
Protestant ministers were pacifists and their congregations,
if not actively agreeing with them, tended to commend them
for their stand.  His re-examination of pacifism concludes
that "While the non-pacifist is as aware of the brutality
of modern war as the pacifist, he is also aware of the brutality
of modern tyranny."[1]  But that statement is of no assistance
to the pacifist in his neuro-linguistic difficulties, for
he identifies the two.  His conflict involves high values and
the experience of crisis.

John Haynes Holmes finds the resolution of the difficulty
in his conclusion that the war is the death throes of "our
modern industrial and imperialistic civilization."[2]  This
takes care of the semantic difficulty by making "war" a thing
rather than a conflict.  By hypostatization, the whole system
of ideas has been moved into the realm of unreality and
rendered innocuous.

If hypostatization and personification are not allowed to
get out of hand, they remain valuable in any group appeal
simply because they secure and hold attention.  Gregory the

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1.  Religion and the Present Crisis, "Re-examining Pacifism"
2.  Out of Darkness N.Y., Harper and Bros. 1942

Great, according to Sala, used to use stories for the masses
and allegory for the elite in his sermons. The lives of the
saints were popular preaching material in the Anglo-Saxon
church because they personified virtue in conflict with vice.
Similarly allegory and stories were used by the medieval friars
in their short, pithy sermons which they were forced to deliver
against all sorts of distractions, including gossiping, business
deals and chess playing in church.

Personality plays a large part in moving the group, not
only thru hypostatization of the cause, but thru the leader
principle. Bernays says of the group, "In making up its mind,
its first impulse us usually to follow the example of a trusted
leader."[1] Hitler uses the leader principle not only to assure
that he himself would have unquestioned obedience but to
give expression to the somewhat medieval mind of Germany and
to satisfy the German's need for recognition by assuring him
a place in a hierarchy of leaders. Everyone has someone to
obey and someone to oppress. His own statement of this idea
is:

> A view of life which, by rejecting the democratic mass
> idea, endeavors to give this world to the best people,
> that means to the most superior men, has logically
> to obey the same aristocratic principle also within
> this people and has to guarantee leadership and highest
> influence within the respective people to the best
> heads. With this it does not build up on the idea of
> the majority, but on that of the personality.[2]

1. Propaganda N.Y. Horace Liveright, 1928, p. 50

2. Op. Cit. p. 661

All religions make use of the leader principle. That Hitler and religion make use of the same methods simply re-enforces the point that men,to be convinced,must be subjected to the usual methods of persuasion. Hitler has certainly learned from the church and his chapter on propaganda may serve to re-educate the church in the techniques it seems to have forgotten.

Comparing propaganda media, he has much to say that will interest "Bible-centered" churches. Printed material, he points out, serves very well to preserve, strengthen and deepen "an already existing attitude or opinion", but it does not often win converts. The first meetings of the Nazi party were "distinguished by the fact that the tables were covered with all kinds of leaflets, newspapers, and pamphlets, etc. But the main emphasis was put on the spoken word. And acutally only the latter alone is in a position to bring about very great changes, and that for general psychological reasons."[1] The chief reason that "all enormous, world revolutionary events have not been brought about by the written, but by the spoken word" is because the speaker can read his audience. He will know whether they will understand, whether they follow what has been said and whether they have been convinced of its correctness. To obtain conviction, the speaker "will repeat...so often in so many new examples, he himself will bring in their objections

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1. Op. Cit. p. 704

which he feels although they have not been uttered, and he will
refute them and disperse them..."

From this survey of propaganda techniques, we find certain
characteristics of the homiletic vocabulary. It must make
use of already existing currents of ideas. (Jesus used and
expanded the current Messiah idea.) It must be vivid,
filled with images and with personification of abstractions.
("There was a sower...") In it the auditor must find the
satisfaction of his inward yearnings for security and recognition.
("Blessed are the meek...") It must be a spoken vocabulary;
not a written vocabulary read aloud. ( The New Testament,
like Hitler's characterization of the Marxist press, is
written by agitators, not an attempt at agitation by writers.)
Finally, the message of religion, embodied in the homiletic
vocabulary, must be applied thru leadership.

In this survey, I have made a great deal of use of Adolf
Hitler. I have illustrated my conclusions with the example
of Christ and the New Testament. There is a difference in
the leaders. There is no difference in the methods used except
in that area of coercion which lies outside of the realm of
propaganda. Both the leaders affirmed without a shadow of
argument. Both repeated their assertions "again and again,
dozens of times in ever new formulations."[1] Both anticipated
the arguments of their opponents and outwitted them. Finally,

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1. <u>Mein Kampf</u> p. p. 107

even in the field of organization, which is but the fringe of
propaganda, each entrusted the propagation of the movement
to a small, devoted band of _members_, knowing that the ideas
which were vital to the movement would form the organization
when it was needful.[1]

Two leaders could hardly be farther apart in their aims.
Yet, because each had to work with common people, each seized
with the intuitions of genius upon the best methods of
moulding his material.

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1. _Op. Cit._ p. 846ff

## An Analysis of Language

Section One:  Destructive.

The pulpit must communicate with the pew if it is to have any influence.  All the techniques of propaganda are of no avail if there is no communication of ideas.  Yet, when we come to examine language, which is the pulpit's medium of communication, we find that it has certain shortcomings.

There is a task before the pulpit today.  As Lynn Harold Hough points out, "It is here that the Christian criticism of life will most fully and decisively and characteristically express itself."[1]  But expression is possible only with a vocabulary suitable to the ideas which are to be expressed.  The vocabulary cannot be simply a set of symbols linked to an idea, since then the symbols must be first learned before the idea may be communicated.  The vocabulary of homiletical expression cannot be a refined laboratory tool, a part of the clinical arcana of an esoteric calling.  The homiletical vocabulary must be rough hewn; not the forceps of the mind, adapted to grasping and conveying minute qualitative differences, but the freight cars of common currency, built to carry rough loads.

Herein lies the difficulty of formulating a homiletical vocabulary.  The freight cars of common currency are, indeed, common carriers.  They bear burdens of old freight, rags and tatters of current sentiments, markings of any number of

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1. The Christian Criticism of Life  N.Y. & Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1941 p301

transients, and, like freight cars generally, travel neither
swiftly nor surely to their destinations. How, then, can
they carry the materials of religious communication?

In the laboratory of religion, Henry Nelson Wieman calls
for four ingredients, symbols, doctrine, the institution,
and, finally, "specifications rationally and empirically
reached concerning the nature of what is most important
for all human living and what it demands of us."[1]  But he
recognizes that religion is not a "philosophical toy" of
the laboratory.  There it is sterile.  "Only among the people
do we find that relatively unselected raw fulness of life
wherein alone the creativity of God can work with potency."[2]
The problem immediately before the preacher is to work on
this "unselected raw fulness" using as his channel of expression
the same medium which it uses itself but shaping it to his
own message which has been selected and refined by the slow
attrition of history to meet needs of which his auditors are
only vaguely conscious or concerning which they are in a
state of complete misapprehension.

But the language which is available, according to students
of language, is entirely inadequate to convey in any sense a
true picture of the world.  That is because it is tied and
bound by the rules of the Aristotelean logic which seeks to
make the world fit the patterns of language rather than fitting
the language to the world.  So strongly does Count Korzybski

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1. <u>Op. Cit.</u> p. 210

object to the Aristotelean system that the very name of the
organization which published his Science and Sanity is the
International Non-Aristotelean Library.

> By necessity (says Korzybski) the Aristotelean system
> was based on macroscopic animal, "sense", sevels, which
> even now predominantly guide the masses. It could
> take into consideration "sense" data, etc., but cannot
> deal adequately with 1941 cultural as well as sanity
> conditions which, as we know today, are resultants of
> sub-microscopic, electro-colloidal processes.[1]

As a result, therefore, "at present the people of the world
do not realize that they are being trained in psychopathological
uses of their nervous systems, and a future generation or
two will become semantically crippled because trained in
such distortions."[2] The "distortion" arises because, willy-
nilly, Aristotle's picture of the actual world was a reflection
of the structure of his language. Ogden and Richards quote
Dr. Whewell as saying that there are two ways of comprehending
nature, one by examining the words of language and their
attendant thoughts and the other by examining the things
themselves. "The Greeks followed the former, the verbal
or notional course and failed."[3]

Semantics, as understood by these writers, is not simply
a brange of philology but a greatly expanded system of dealing
with the world symbolically.[4] Rather than deal with purely

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1. Alfred Korzybski Science and Sanity The International Non-
          Aristotelean Library, the Science Press, 1933
          (2nd ed, 1941) p. xl

2. Ibid.

3. Op. Cit. p. 48

4. Walpole (Op. Cit. p. 20) charges Science and Sanity is a
   "grand tour" which omits the essence of the subject.

verbal definition, Korzybski announces the intention of
"general semantics" to deal with "neuro-semantic and neuro-
linguistic living reactions of Smith$_1$, Smith$_2$, etc., as their
reactions to neuro-semantic and neuro-linguistic environments
as environments."[1]  It may be noted here that a peculiarity
of general semantics is oddity of spelling and punctuation with
subscript numbers, quotation marks and the indefinite etc.,
which implies an infinite regression of facts of which only
a portion are understood and still fewer pinned down by any
one word.

In this connection, it is virtually a rallying cry with the
semanticists that "the intensional abstract...labels a
fiction."[2]  That is to say, the category considered under a
word as the essence of the object is non-existent.  As
scholastics, they would have been nominalists.  Korzybski
declares as a prime datum of semantics that "the objective
level is un-speakable...and we deal only with absolute
individuals, each one different from the other."[3]  Knowledge
begins with an event in "space-time" which becomes a sensed
object, turned by the obscure electro-colloidal processes
into a psychological picture and then tagged with a verbal
definition.  Thus actual knowledge is far from the event
in space-time and,when we use the verbal terms of sensation,

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1. Op. Cit. p. x

2. Ibid. p. xxx

3. Ibid. p. 372

we are manufacturing non-existent structures, "a delusional
world non-similar in structure to the world around us."[1]

The point of difference between Korzybski and his fellow
semanticists is that he feels that they take no account of
evaluation, but simply of "operational methods" and "referents."
"We must," he says, "therefore, work out a theory of evaluation
which is based on the optimum electro-colloidal action and
reaction of the nervous system."[2]  This he proceeds to do
by evolving a system of description based on relationships.
"It is of extreme importance to realize that the relational.,
attitude is optional and can be applied everywhere and always...
Thus, any object can be considered as a set of relations of
its parts."[3]

An extreme attempt to devise a new system of linguistic
communication is that of Rudolf Carnap in his Logical Syntax
of Language.  In the foreword he declares that "Philosophy
is to be replaced by the logic of science--that is to say, by
the logical analysis of the concepts and the sentences of the
sciences, for the logic of science is nothing other than the
logical syntax of the language of science."[4]

What Carnap seeks to perfect, then, is a mathematical
calculus of language.  "By calculus," he declares, "is

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1. Op. Cit. p. 385

2. Ibid. p. xi

3. Ibid. p. 385  The period after "relational" is his own punctuation.

4. Op. Cit. N.Y. Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1937

understood a system of conventions or rules...concerned with
elements--the so-called symbols--about the nature and relations
of which nothing more is assumed than that they are distributed
in various classes.  Any finite series of these symbols is
called an expression of the calculus in question."[1]

He finds that sentences fall into three groups, object,
pseudo-object (also called "quasi-syntactical")and syntactical.
The sentence, "Five is a number" is an object sentence, the
"is" of which implies identity and hence leads to confusion.
"Five is not a thing but a number" is a pseudo-object sentence.
Sentences of this type "mislead us into thinking that we are
dealing with extra-linguistic objects such as numbers, things,
properties..." when we are simply dealing with language
expressions.[2]  The syntactical sentence would be, "5 is not
a thing-word but a number-word."

It is hardly likely that Carnap's syntactical system will
be adopted.  In spite of Korzybski and the other semanticists,
we are likely to go on speaking as if the structure of language
were the structure of reality.  It is, in fact, the structure
of reality as we perceive it.  Should we ever see reality with
different eyes, our language would change automatically.  In the
meantime, the semanticists, while providing us with much
interesting information concerning the nature and the inadequacies

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1. Op. Cit.  p. 4
2. Ibid. p. 298

of language, offer no convenient tool for the unspecialized
communication from the pulpit. The very inadequacies, the
emotive words, the tendency to hypostatize and the inexact
thinking of which the semanticists complain, are part and
parcel of the language of the man in the pew and the preacher
must either speak to him in his own language or teach him a
new one.

The writings of the semanticists demonstrate two things
of importance to this study: that we cannot hope to use
language in the exact re-presentation of reality, and that
the world-view of a people is intimately linked with its
language. The second point is really a demonstration of the
first and may logically either follow or precede it. Because
language is linked with a particular world-view, which we cannot
certainly know as correct, it is unavailable for the presentation
of any other possible world-view. Or we can say, because
language is inexact, we cannot frame from it an accurate
picture of the world. Knowing that no given sentence will
pass from speaker to auditor without dropping some of the
meaning which it had for the speaker and picking up a
quantity of quite different meaning, we can abandon the search
for precision in favor of a total effect conveyed thru
relationship and context.

Section two:  Constructive.

Man lives in a social context.  He dwells in a series of
overlapping crowds, ranging from humanity down to his lodge
or the temporary crowd he may join on a street corner.  Each
crowd has some bearing upon his thoughts and actions.  As a
rough rule, we may say that the greatest crowd moves him most
deeply below the conscious level, and that the smallest crowd
determines his immediate expression of those deep drives.

Language, like any other tool or technique invented or
adopted by man, finds its source in necessity.  But the necessity
that governs language is a clear demonstration that man's
need does not end with his stomach.  Spengler's notion of
extension symbols is an excellent illustration of the interlocking
of language and the world-view of culture whether or not the
symbols he chooses happen to be exactly true for the cultures
to which he assigns them.

> From the purest analytical space and from Nirvana
> to the most somatic reality of Athens, there is a
> series of prime symbols, each of which is capable of
> forming a complete world out of itself.  And, as the
> idea of the Babylonian or that of the Indian world was
> remote, strange and elusive for the men of the five,
> or six Cultures that followed, so also the Western
> World will be incomprehensible to the men of Cultures
> yet unborn.[1]

When a prime symbol, whatever it may be, forms a complete
world of itself, it does so in terms of language.  Thus there
only remains common to two language world the "things" that
make up the material universe.  But those "things" take a
strangely different coloring to the men of the two worlds.

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1. The Decline of the West, vol. I, p. 180

Without going so far afield as the broad stream of world
cultural history, it is sufficient to point out that
"Words as designations of notions are only products of the
object of the sentence, and hence it is that the vocabulary
of a hunting tribe is from the outset different from that of
a village of cowherds or a sea-faring coastal population."[1]
Or, again, the difference of time-feeling of the Hopi and the
Anglo-Saxon emerges vividly in the table printed by Hayakawa
showing the different series of concepts used by the two
languages to cover the possible temporal relations of the
active verb, "to run."[2]  The Hopi simply expresses running,
where the English uses a system of auxiliaries to orient the
running exactly in time.

Once the language is formed, it freezes in its turn the
culture.  Most of the anguish of the semanticisists is
directed at the freezing of western thought in the form of
western language.  The very title of Stuart Chase's book
of popular semantics, The Tyranny of Words, expresses the
difficulty as they see it.  Words, they feel, have become
things and the logical pattern of words in language has
become for the mind of men the logical pattern of things in
the universe.

Ralph Monroe Eaton expresses the thought, without the anguish,
in this paragraph:

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1. Man and Technics p. 55

2. S. I. Hayakawa Language in action N.Y. Harcourt, Brace & Co.
   1941, p. 312

> Logical form is so woven into speech, and even into the
> play of the imagination, that it is impossible to
> utter a phrase or call to mind the images of a past
> or future experience without throwing them into the
> forms we have described.  To say that a fact is not
> of logical form is to say that no significant assertion
> can be made about it; that it is not a fact.  Such a
> "fact" is placed beyond the reach of thought or rational
> experience.[1]

Yet in the experience of man there are events which do not

easily fall into the logical patterns of speech.  Some thinkers,

faced with this difficulty, eliminate or at least delimit logic

and accept the irrational as it is experienced.  The semanticists

prefer to re-create language by eliminating Aristotle.  They

are nominalists and they see the hypostatization of abstractions

as the great danger to clear thinking.

Ogden and Richards, who are extremely influential in modern

progressive education, take the positivist step of driving

all words back to their prime referents.  Universal qualities,

they find to be "phantoms due to the refractive power of the

linguistic medium."[2]  They declare that classes and universals

are but symbolic fictions and that the quicker they are

recognized as such, the sooner "the world of Pure Being" will

be vacated by its shadowy dwellers.  They put forwar three

"canons of symbolism" which seeks to fix the referent

experientially.  The first canon is that "One symbol stands

for one and only one referent."  From this it follows that,

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1. Symbolism and Truth Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
   1925 p. 65

2. The Meaning of Meaning p. 186

"Symbols which can be substituted one for another symbolize
the same referents," and finally that, "The referent of
a contracted symbol is the referent of that symbol expanded."
Of the last canon, they say, "The consequences of infringing
this canon are sometimes called philosophy..."[1]

Korzybski is at odds with Ogden and Richards because of
their assurance that the semantic difficulty is settled simply
by turning back to the prime referents.  He points out that
the semantics created by their method are purely verbal and
contain no values or standards of evaluation.  His own
theory of relationships has been described in the first section
of this chapter.  Like them, however, he is an extreme
nominalist.  One linguistic misconception which he continually
attacks is that of purely verbal separations which language
creates when there is really only one idea.  Such a verbal
split is that of space and time where there is only the
perception of "space-time."  The most corrupting split is the
derivation of essence from an object.  This verbal habit is
responsible for the mind's continually driving the differences
between things into the unconscious and only perceiving unity.
In fact, each object is unique and class labels are a mere
convenience.

He uses the term "$\frac{\text{over}}{\text{under}}$ definition" to describe the failure
of class definition to deal with reality.  A house, for
example, is over-defined by the dictionary in the sense that

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1. Op. Cit. p. 186

it is over-limited.  In the dictionary, it is a purely verbal
figment that no one can live in.  It is under-defined in that
all the actual elements of any particular house, e.g., the
possibility of termites, is not included.  In actual practice,
too, the border-line between the appropriate labels for
different types of shelters is not an empirical border-line.
The dictionary is utterly confused when a wealthy playboy
speaks of a ten-thousand dollar cabana on a private beach as
"my shack."

The basis of his semantics is his challenging of belief
in verbal formulations (over-definition) and his attempt to
extend the real definition to an evaluated relation of facts
pertaining to each unique object.  The failure of the dictionary
to take this last step is what he means by "under-definition."

Another approach to the task of fixing language in relation
to reality is that of Hugh Walpole who seeks to place the
given word ("sign") in its context thru the practice of
"multiple definition", or the listing of substitute signs, and
"archetypation", which is "the process of anchoring a word to
some lucid and typical example of its use."[1]  Before the
word can be really known, it must be sampled in its contexts
and the relation of its meanings in the various contexts must
be understood.  To neglect this step of related meanings, he
says, is, in effect, to throw the word away.[2]

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1. Semantics p. 90

2. Ibid. p. 23

The process of sampling a word in its context is not in the least limited to the purely verbal, literary context in which it may be found. Meaning exists only in the relation between an organism, a sign, and the context of the sign. In a somewhat similar arrangement to Ogden and Richards' canons of symbolism, he lays down rules governing the meaning of signs in context.

1.    A sign is an object similar to some object that has played a part in a previous experience.

2.    The sign is interpreted by an individual organism.

3.    The interpretation of a sign depends upon the organism's past experience.

4.    The context interests the organism.

5.    The sign has a certain aggressiveness.

6.    Signs are not permanent.[1]

He illustrates these rules with the story of a hen who ate a brightly colored bug and experienced internal pains. In the future, anything of similar appearance and coloring would be avoided. The context, in this case, is that the hen is hungry and the bug looks like food. The bright coloring is an aggressive sign. Perhaps the hen might later discover a bug of similar coloring that was good to eat and so forget the first significance of the sign.

Walpole makes a practical application of his rules when he says, "Half the battle in understanding what anybody is

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1. Op. Cit. p. 78

saying consists in making a mental note of the things he is
taking for granted."[1]  That is, to note the context of
symbol, psychology and physical environment.  The principle
operates just as well in paraphrase:  "Half the battle in
conveying an idea to anyone consists in knowing the contexts
in which he will place your words."  An example of that
sort of thing is the plight of the preacher who discovers that
his illustration concerning the King of Troy was taken as
a personal insult by the senior warden.

The truth of this notion of context is well illustrated
in this declaration by Spengler:  "There are no 'men-in-
themselves'...but only men of a time, a locality, of a race,
of a personal cast, who contend in battle with a given world..."[2]
But so far as the semanticists are under the impression that
they have pointed out a road to semantic salvation that mankind
will sensibly take, we must agree with LeBon:

> The life of a people, its institutions, beliefs, and
> arts are but the visible expression of its invisible
> soul.  For a people to transform its institutions, beliefs,
> and arts, it must first transform its soul; to enable it
> to bequeath its civilization to another people, it would
> be necessary that it should be able to bequeath its
> soul.[3]

The language of a people is a kind of archetype of its
soul.  It is not simply a medium for the expression of thought,

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1. Op. Cit. p. 111

2. Man and Technics p. 15

3. The Psychology of Peoples, N.Y., G. E. Stechert & Co.
   1912, p. xix

but is itself an _idea_.  "Men possess thoughts," Professor

Kantorowicz said to Max Lerner, "But ideas possess men."[1]

The effective ideas in modern history, observation would

seem to indicate, are no longer the ideas of the top of the

head but the old, old, ideas that saturate the being.

Sorokin finds, as an indication of the gap between his

"sensate" and "ideational" cultures, an absence of recognized

value.  "Since no socio-cultural norms--universally accepted

and recognized--exist any more in the culture itself, no

such norms can be present in the mentality of the individuals

and groups."[2]  Man, of course, cannot exist without norms.

What Sorokin means, I think, is that there are no conveniently

expressed norms.  That is why, at this time, the shifting

crowds of the West are so ready to accept any formulation

that seems to embody the old, deeply felt, culture-ideas.

Man, from from time to time seems committed to the notion

that the abstract principles of logical language can settle

his problems, seems to be moving toward irrationality.  In

spite of their efforts to formulate a "logical syntax of

language", it appears to me that that is what the semanticists

represent.  Certainly the practice of dealing with all objects

as unique in themselves would seem to offer an effective bar

to abstract thought.

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1. Max Lerner _Ideas are Weapons_ N.Y., The Viking Press,
            1939, p. 3

2. _The Crisis of Our Age_ p. 304

Lerner styles it a "Copernican revolution in ideas" that "the rational right-thinking man has as surely ceased to be regarded the center of our intellectual system as the earth has ceased to be regarded the center of our planetary system."[1] If this is the trend of modern thought, and the current seems to be strong, language can no longer bee seen as a precise machine. The idea cannot be constructed like a brick wall, unit by unit in mathematical relationship. Language no longer has any mathematics. The meaning cannot be conveyed in words but on and around the words with an over-all context driving toward a single impact.

> The meaning of an idea must be seen as the focus of four principal converging strains; the man and his biography; the intellectual tradition; the social context, or the age and its biography; the historical consequences of the idea, or the successive audiences that receive it.[2]

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1. _Op. Cit_. p. 4

2. _Ibid_. p. 6

## Myth in Context

"Myth" is a dangerous word. Man likes to feel that he is
dealing with concrete certainties, that his arrangements of
verbal formulations express the "truth." Hence the advocacy
of myth as a practical means of communication is apt to be
rejected as the advocacy of deliberate lie. Yet, tho the
scientist does not use the word, he is willing to recognize
his theories as practical myths. His only concern is that
they work, not that they partake of the true nature of an
absolute realm of being. Here the scientist is content with
far less than the philosopher. Spengler points up the
scientific myth in relation to his own notion of culture-types:
"_every_ scientific theory is a _myth_ of the understanding about
nature's forces, and every one is dependent, through and through,
upon the religion with which it belongs."[1] Here is the essence
of the "myth in context." It is a workable and likely tale.
The form that it takes depends on the world-view of the culture
in which it grows.

The myth itself may be defined as an arrangement of symbols.
The symbols themselves are more or less arbitrary and are
determined by the crisis of the moment as it is perceived by
those who live in the crisis. The symbols are primarily ideas.
Tho they may be shorthanded into words or brief phrases, they
constitute an added freight that these words and phrases must
bear over and above their primary "referential" meaning.

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1: _Man and Technics_ p. 82

Due to this added freight or additional dynamic "charge", the
words take on a signal value in relation to the crisis. In
that particular context of history, they take on a meaning
which cannot be recognized in any other historical context.

The myth arranges these symbols according to the pattern
which it must express. The religious myths, at least, are
the re-expression of age-old drives and experiences of mankind
in terms of the momentary manifestation of those drives within
a particular spacial and temporal social group. The constant
factor is the form which governs the relation of symbols. Thus,
behind the symbols, within their pattern and their relationship
with one another and with history, there is to be sensed a
picture of an experience which is something beyond the myth.
Ralph Monroe Eaton quotes L. Wittgenstein as saying:

> We make to ourselves pictures of facts. In the picture
> and the picture and the pictured there must be something
> identical in order that one can be a picture of the
> other at all. What the picture must have in common
> with reality in order to be able to represent it after
> its manner--rightly or falsely--is its form of representation.[1]

The identity of the picture with reality, then, is the
identity of its form. The symbols and their groupings are
not reality but they represent with reasonable exactness real
relations. "A symbolic group is a black and white portrait
of a fact; it leaves out everything but the identities,
diversities and the groupings of the original."[2]

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1. Op. Cit. p. viii
2. Ibid. p. 60

Language without a mathematically precise logical syntax
expresses itself naturally and primitively in terms of myth
and symbol. Both before the mind has obtained the precision
instrument of logic and after it has worn out that instrument,
the activities of the curious mind or the mind bent on
expressing its feeling and aspirations or even its observations,
will use the "picture writing" of myth and symbol.

"Both in the primitive mind and in the mind of the child,
the activities are mainly those of wishing, feeling and
picturing, without strong rational or co-ordinative development,"
writes E. Graham Howe.[1] These activities are best expressed
in the sub-rational level of word-picture making, in the fairy
tale, nursery rhyme, folk-lore, myth, allegory and parable, an
ascending scale. Picture-making, like much that is primitive,
lends itself well to the expression of basic truths too deep
for the stereotyped techniques of rationality.

Myth reaches out beyond the immediate experience and
returns with the workaday freight cars of common commerce
loaded with new values and intuitions. It gives new meaning
to old things.

> The concepts of space, time and number furnish the
> actual structural elements of objective experience as
> they build themselves up in language, but they fulfil
> their task only because, according to their total
> structure, they keep in an ideal medium, precisely
> because, while they constantly keep to the form of
> sensuous experience, they progressively fill the
> sensuous with spiritual content.[2]

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1. Motives and Mechanisms of the Mind London, The Lancet Ltd.
   1931, p. 39

2. Urban, quoted by H. Wheeler Robinson Redemption and Revelation
   N.Y. and Lon. Harper & Bros., 1942 p. 706

Robinson, with a somewhat medieval intuition, declares,
"Some correspondence between the human and supra-human realms
must obtain, if our symbols are to have any real  meaning
outside our experience."[1]  He feels that the Christian
conception of the Holy Ghost is a guarantee of this correspondence
since it makes our language sacramental "and so transforms
'symbolic' into 'real' knowledge."[2]  In this manner, a word
moves from the position of a symbol of an experience to a
representation of the experience itself as a symbol for
something beyond.

This is obviously counter to the whole trend of thought
which the semanticists seek to foster.  Symbols used in this
way become, for Walpole, "emotive" and "fictive" words.  He
stresses that they must not be thought of as anything concrete.
Like the "ghosts" of ideals, they have come from the concrete
sense world and must be made to return to it.  Yet they are
valuable because "Fictions are a linguistic necessity, and
emotive language is another name for poetry, which is a human
necessity."[3]  What is more important to the propagandist is
that, "In addition to their sense values, our most important
fictions have aesthetic and ethical implications--they are
emotive as well as referential."[4]  This is the element that
makes myth not only useful but essential to "preaching for
a verdict."

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1. Op. Cit. p. 52

2. Ibid. p. 55

3. Semantics p. 56

4. Ibid. p. 176

"Words in themselves mean nothing until they are referred to life."[1]  Reason may be "root-cut", detached from the source of life, but myth wells from the depths.  At each stage in its growth it has been in accord with life in its deepest significance.  The great Greek myths that have become mere stories for children have fallen because their currency was cut off and their significance forgotten.  To read them again, it is necessary to know their language, their context in history and the need that formed them.

Myth cannot, however, be made of whole cloth.  There are factors that govern its significance.  Primarily a myth must stem from the experience of the whole group and be recognizable to the group as carrying a meaning beyond the appearance of things.  The religious myth, in its task of imposing a pattern of unity upon the disparate things of the world, cannot remain true to the experience of the race unless it maintains the older formulations within its new expression.  The religious answer, like all myth, must be true.  It must be immediately felt as real and valid and it cannot be so felt unless it is a moral answer in terms of an all embracing moral sentiment.

Gardner declares that a man without such sentiments is a "moral invertebrate" and that moral sentiments in any group range themselves upward toward the highest realm of abstraction.[2] This highest realm of abstraction may be the dwelling place

1.  Redemption and Revelation p. 43

2.  Psychology and Preaching p. 98

of what Walpole calls "semantic ghosts" but they are powerful
"ghosts."  They are unrealized ideals and, as such, "like
all constructions of the imagination" are based on experience.[1]
There is a natural tendency to hypostatize these ideals since
they represent an area of life-giving belief.  In this area
as in any other area, Gardner points out, doubt, if carried
far enough ultimately suspends the life-process.[2] In most
people, these areas are kept alive, even if they are meagerly
nourished.  They must be fed and strengthened and finally
made to feel the full impact of the Christian message.

There may be conceivably better statements of the real
message of Christianity than the traditional orthodox
phraseology but I doubt very much that there is a more effective
statement.  It is true that the orthodox phrasing encounters
an immediate opposition in the minds of many because of the
general circulation in the years between the wars of debunking
material.  Yet I believe that it is easier to by-pass such
objection than it is to give the appearance of validity to
an entirely novel statement.  The novel statement has no
weight of tradition and, rather than securing its own acceptance
thru its internal validity, it is likely simply to act as the
stimulus for the individual to create his own still more novel
and probably less helpful statement.  As far as novelty goes,
the current misrepresentations of traditional Christianity are
so warped that any true statement is likely to be a distinct
novelty.

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1. <u>Psychology and Preaching</u> p. 107

2. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 146

From a purely artistic standpoint, there is certainly no
greater story of the resolution of the conflict between man's
finite and determined nature and his infinite and free will
than the story of the cross.  Here God feels man's pain, here
He takes his place beside his creature "in the midst of the
tragedy brought to man by the treachery which lurks in his
heart and poisons his life."  Lynn Harold Hough rightly declares,
"this is the most tremendous conception which can come to the
preacher."[1]

The traditional formulations of the church are valid and
acceptable today because they have strength.  In spite of all
the saccharine, pink and gold statements of Christians in
decadent times, the primitive strength of Christianity remains
a strength which strikes at the heart of the problem.  This
formulation of man's problem and of its resolution has been
part of the life of Western man thruout his history.

It is interesting to see that the Christian formula of
salvation is applied, perhaps unwittingly, by Sorokin to
his own resolution of the crisis of our times.  It is the
"compact formula" of crisis, ordeal, catharsis, charisma,
resurrection.[2]  Sorokin has his own interpretation of these
words.  Resurrection is the finding of a new root for society.
Grace, charisma, is the replacement of atomized values with a

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1.  The Christian Criticism of Life p. 310

2.  The Crisis of our Age p. 321

new universalization and absolutization.  These statements
apply in the context in which he is thinking, but the words in
their series as they stand are suggestive of tremendous context
of meaning which may be interpreted forcefully in terms of
the Christian story because that story has meaning to begin
with.

Crisis, ordeal, catharsis, charisma and resurrection,
interpreted and re-interpreted in the changing light of history,
hold the answer to man's tragic finitude, the censure for
his infinite presumption, and they are capable of creating
symbols that echo with ever deeper and deeper meaning.
There is no need for new homiletic expressions to change the
verbal formulations of the old credal myths.  They have the
power and strength of ancient hills.  The new expressions are
not credal but theological, shining their temporary light upon
the creeds so that the eyes of today may see the strength of
yesterday.

In order so to illuminate the mind of modern man, the
necessary "myths of the understanding" must be true.  That is
to say, their relationship to the religious experience of the
race must be significant.  Eaton quotes Hobbes as saying,
"True and false are attributes of speech, not of things...
truth is the right ordering of names."  From which, Eaton
concludes, "A symbol is true if it stands for an object."[1]

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1. Symbolism and Truth p. 149

The principle can be extended to the myth itself.  If the
symbols are true and if their ordering is right, the myth
posesses truth.

Right ordering is significant ordering.  "The existence
of meaning is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of
the existence of truth."[1]  We may sum up Eaton's notion of
the relation of truth and symbol with these two quotations:

> To apprehend a truth is to apprehend the existence
> of something meant.  Thus knowledge from the outset
> is directed toward reality, and finally toward a
> metaphysical goal.[2]

> Yet it must not be forgotten that a symbol is more than
> a mark, a sound, a gesture, or an image; it is any
> of these together with the psychical attitudes to
> which it gives birth.  Symbols are concepts, and to
> say that truth is a property of symbols is to say that
> it is a property of concepts.[3]

Myths are no more than stories when they are separated
from their significance.  The next crisis seems always to
forget the meaning of the myths of the last crisis.  The
religious intuition, sure that the crisis is a continuing
crisis of man's own nature, must continually forge new
expressions for the old myths so that they will remain
significant.  It is important in Eaton's thinking that symbolic
knowledge is aimed at reality and beyond to a metaphysical
goal.  The knowledge contained in the religious experience
of the race is beyond the "referents" of positivism.  It

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1. Op. Cit. p. 149

2. Ibid. p. 150

3. Ibid. p. 149

is, however, the knowledge of experience.  Religious myth,
like all "myths of the understanding", is thus faced with
two tests:  does it accord with past experience, does it
work?  These are the only two tests that can justly be applied
to the validity of myth.

If these two tests are continually applied, the very grave
dangers of symbolic statement can be avoided.  Symbolism
undoubtedly has faults that more mathematical types of expression
lack.  Out of context, the story becomes just a story.
In an instance, such as the Bible, a reverence for the story,
continuing at a time when the significance was lost, can
approach sheer idiocy.  The mythical formulation is the
only means by which ideas above the level of sense can
be handled, yet, "symbolism, apart from its undoubted value,
is the source of a very subtle and serious danger, which is
that in the riot of feeling which a symbol may arouse, its
meaning may be ignored."[1]  Howe adds, "We are sometimes liable
to like our words because we fear their meaning."  A myth
is often a pretty thing conveying a disagreeable truth.  It
remains much more pleasant to consider the myth than the
truth--as all popular religion shows.  It is easier, for
example (to consider a myth of action) to buy a Bible for the
center table than to read it.

It is necessary, in dealing with myth, to remember that
no single formulation contains all of the truth.  All of the

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1. Motives and Mechanisms of the Mind  p. 44

the symbols are not available nor has the pattern of their
arrangement been tested by all the future experiences of
the race.  Several formulations may exist contemporaneously
in different groups and all be equally "true", i.e., equally
in accord with the experiences of their several groups.
The value of a myth is the value of its effectiveness for the
group within which it is forged.  Myths are not, after all,
created for intellectual entertainment but for use.

An interesting example of the symbolic in preaching is
the seventeenth century in England when "Ingenuity overleapt
itself in seeking strange symbols and similes, and strange
titles for the sermons in which they appeared."[1]  This, of
course, was not genuine myth but rather allegory, which
is as sophisticated as myth is primitive.  Like myth, however,
it sought, by "discovering resemblances between the most
disparate things", to point out real relationships.  The
greatness of the seventeenth century preachers, says Mitchell,
"Was demonstrated not by their choice of different preaching
material, but by their different handling of the common
deposit."[2]  Their sermons were virtually a mosaic of such
writings, enlivened by far-fetched parallels that seem to
have been little more than puns.  Possibly the interest of
the man in the pew was chiefly aroused by the question in
his mind whether or not the preacher would be able to bring

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1. English Pulpit Oratory p. 7

2. Ibid. p. 398

his parallel home.  The great ones always did.  The second
raters not only "overleapt themselves" but failed to scramble
back.

While an interesting example of decidedly symbolic preaching,
the seventeenth century divines lacked the element of true
myth, the folk creation.  Folk-expression thru the creation
of myth, says Santayana, always puts the "reconstructed logical
gods of the metaphysicians" to shame because they are not the
creations of any one man but "the slow product of the pious
and poetic imagination."[1]  Starting from some personification
of an idea or from some great man, devotion has been heaped
upon devotion by generations of the devout.  He elaborates
this notion in an outline of the creation of the myth of
the Virgin Mary from two meagre sources, the nativity and
the crucifixion.  Everything else is "spontaneous sympathetic
expansion."  Then, speaking of the "foolish iconoclasm" of the
Protestant mind, he says, significantly at a time when "the
prophetic ministry" is receiving such stress:

> Perhaps it is a sign of the average imaginative dulness
> or fatigue of certain races and epochs that they so
> readily abandon these supreme creations.  For, if we
> are hopeful, why should we not believe that the best
> we can fancy is also the truest; and if we are distrustful
> in general of our prophetic gifts, why should we cling
> only to the most mean and formless of our illusions?[2]

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1. George Santayana The Sense of Beauty New York, Charles
                    Scribner's sons, 1936, p. 140

2. Ibid. p. 143

## Concluding Summary

The Problem:

The problem of preaching is the effective communication
of salvation.  Salvation, as far as the group is concerned,
may be defined as the reversal of currents of human life
from a historical trend toward disintegration to an integration
expressed in a meaningful picture of the world.  The effective
communication of salvation is not only an expression of the
meaningful world-view but an expression in such a way that
the group commits itself to action in accord with that view.
Thus counter-currents are set up and the preaching has achieved
its end.

This problemof preaching is the problem of practical
religion.  Organized religion, the cultus, the theology and
the credal formulations, exists, so far as the individual is
concerned, to achieve this integration under a meaningful
world-view.  All speculative and mystical religion exists
as a kind of undercurrent to this effort.  The real end of
a social religion is not gained until the society is induced
to accept the world-view which the mystics intuit and the
philosophers construct.

The first element of organized religion is man's own
predicament.  Without the predicament, there would be no
religious need.  The predicament can be expressed briefly
as man's consciousness of disintegrative influences working
within himself and of his own inadequacy to deal with them.

The sense of inadequacy is important. Without that sense,
man does not truly realize that he is in a predicament.

Over and against man's sense of inadequacy, to complete
the religious balance, there must be a religious solution.
With inadequacy alone, there is a sense of frustration,
perhaps accompanied by a yearning for something dependable
that assures man that all is not grass that withereth. The
yearning itself does not make the religion. The religion
arises where there is the authoritative declaration that there
is a dependable element in the world; in the Christian statement,
"a God who cares."

The sense of inadequacy and the religious response to that
sense, between them create the religious expression which
is man's feeling of "absolute dependence." This is the expression
of religion in the West at least. There may be other expressions
better calculated to fit the religions of the East, but I
feel that even they can be related to the western expression.

The predicament and the response are not religion unless
they be brought into vital contact. All men, fortunately,
are not theologians. They cannot call on him in whom they
have not believed nor believe until they have heard. Before
they can hear, there must be a preacher who speaks a language
that they can understand. The religious solution cannot
be applied to man's predicament until he is convinced that
it is the correct solution. It is the duty of the preacher
to convince by communicating the religious solution in terms
of man's own apprehension of his crisis. It is his duty

to deepen and clarify man's sense of crisis until he sees that the proffered solution is the right solution. For the currents of salvation to be set up, man must be convinced and motivated. Religion must become effective in terms of his own picture of the world.

Effective communication is not a simple thing. The mathematical vocabulary of science is not available for homiletics because the subject of homiletics is not quantitatively measurable either in volume, weight or force. Men's religious experiences are not the same because, except in simple and quantitative measurements, their experience of the world is not the same. Each man and each group of men feels that its own experience of the universe is the right one. Consequently, an expression of a consistent world-picture in terms appreciable by one group or, in the case of a mystic, by one individual, is of no effect whatever in dealing with another group or individual. Of course there are some common elements to all expressions because all mankind shares in a basic pattern but, with a radically different expression, the common elements are likely rather to add to the confusion than be an aid to understanding. The familiar elements in an alien expression make the utterly alien elements even more unexpected and confusing.

The bias of a group's world outlook is expressed by its language. This statement applies either to national languages or to group jargons or the variation in logical syntax

from age to age within a given national language.  Santayana
describes the utterly different world view that would be held
by a group which had no nouns in its language and so must
substitute lists of adjectives and adverbs.[1]  The outlook
would be beautiful,but almost incomprehensible to an alien,
noun-using people.  Santayana is a sceptic who accepts no
language picture as a picture of reality.  He asserts flatly
that we cannot know reality.  We can, however, make a workable
picture of it.  The picture may or may not be true.  So long
as it corresponds with experience it is adequate.

The difficulty intervening in religious communication
today is that the theologian's lanugage is not the language
of the people.  Time was when the whole of New England thought
was colored by theological and Biblical terms.  Everyone
understood what was meant by "justification", "original sin",
"salvation", and "redemption."  That is not to say that the
man in the pew had as adequate or as elaborate a picture of
the significance of the word as did the professional theologian,
but the correspondence was in the same channel so that each
word stood in workable relation.  Today a high-school
chemistry student and an analytical chemist have the same
basic understanding of such terms as "atom", "molecule",
"reaction", and "catalyst."  They can communicate with one
another.  Neither, without some special training, can
communicate with a theologian.  The theologian has long

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1. Op. Cit. p. 130

ago created an adequate world-view. Now, as a preacher, he seeks to impose that picture upon a group that no longer thinks in his language. By indirection, he may be able to convey an inkling of what he is talking about. It is better if he change his language.

The Solution:

The creation of a workable homiletical language is the solution advocated in this thesis. To create such a language, it is first of all necessary to recognize that no language is true in the sense that it is an exact re-presentation of reality. The totality of reality is beyond language as it is beyond experience. There are any number of workable languages. Reality, as experiences, may thus be presented in any number of different ways. Each system of philosophy is really a new language since philosophy is the hypothetical construction of the relations which experiences may bear to one another. Santayana's principle is that it is possible, but unlikely, that one of these systems might actually conform with the true nature of things.[1] Such a correspondence would not matter in the least because man could never know of it.

It is necessary to attack the position that the logical structure of language is the logical structure of reality because the preacher must break away from the feeling that his language is a "true" picture of reality and that other languages

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1. Op. Cit. p. 106

are "false."  So long as he feels that he is speaking the
"true" language, he must teach it to those to whom he is
speaking before he can express anything in it.  Actually,
any group of symbols can express the experience of any reality
if those symbols are agreed upon.  This is demonstrated by
the ability of any age to write the history of any past
age altho each age thinks in different symbolic terms.
Thomas Aquinas could hardly be expected to understand a marxist
history of his own age.  Marx could not understand Spengler
very well altho they both refer to Hegel.  I doubt very
much if Hegel could understand his own disciples.  The symbols
of each history are different, tho they are arranged to cover
the same patterns of experience.

The grouping of symbols is myth-making.  The symbols are
chosen by the process of history.  The myth-maker does not
need to create them.  They are ready to hand.  What he does
with them is to arrange them in an order which corresponds
with experience of the type which he wishes to explicate.
The process is exactly the same as that of the map-maker who
posesses certain arbitrary symbols for rivers, mountains,
cultivated fields, forests and all the other elements of
topography.  None of the symbols is more than an ideograph
for the thing represented.  In relation upon the map, they
are not a landscape.  Yet they present to the mind a
workable picture of reality so that one may know the
geographical relation of the mountains, rivers and forests
represented.

In the same way, myth presents symbols in a relationship corresponding with experience. The preacher takes symbols from the current language of the group and arranges them so that they represent religious experience while yet maintaining their pattern in the other experiences of which they form a part. It is as if experiences were represented by a number of nails driven into a board and joined together into patterns with bits of colored string. The preacher must impose a pattern upon the patterns which will unify them into a meaningful whole. Wieman's "source of meaning and value" and Whitehead's "principle of concretion" are such patterns. Neither one is true or false. They are simply effective or ineffecitve, depending upon the group in which they are applied.

Assuming that each group posgesses the same important experiences, represented by the number and position of the nails driven into the board, each group will have its own system of colored strings representing to them the nature of reality. This is the reason why the preacher cannot content himself with imposing exactly the same superior pattern in each instance. To revert to the cartographical simile, a course must be charted differently upon each of the several kinds of maps known to the cartographers. The route traveled will be the same, but, in plotting the route, the suppositions upon which the map is based must be taken into consideration. So a myth which reveals to one kind of mind

a pattern that unifies the patterns will not fit another kind
of mind.  Since it is the religious experience of the race
and not the myths into which those experiences have been cast
from time to time which is the important element in the
religious solution to man's predicament, the preacher will
not seek to impose a particular myth, but will search out
a myth which works.

A myth to be "true", must first of all accord with religious
experience.  It must then find expression in terms of the
symbols which the group has assigned to all the elements of
its own experience.  Finally, it must unify those experiences
into a single pattern that expresses them all in their value
and relationships.  Doing these things, it will be compelling
in its power and will secure control of the group mind so
that it has formative effect on the making of patterns out of
future experience.

Myth is not made up out of whole cloth.  The race has
its fund of spiritual experience and it has its outworn
mythical expressions of those experiences.  The new myth
must remain in the tradition.  It cannot deny the former
myths but must be the last in a logical progression, taking
the former myths into its own pattern of reality.  A myth
becomes outworn when it ceases to present a workable
picture of the world.  A new myth revitalizes the old by
demonstrating that its picture of the world remains workable
and that only the expression has changed.

The preacher-theologian as myth-maker operates with the religious experience of the past upon the perplexities of the group at hand thru suitable verbal formulations.  He himself as a religious man will know what experiences he deems significant for the present moment.  If he does his work well, the myth he creates will be a clear and polished lens thru which the light of eternity can shine and illumine the momentary context of history.  In this thesis, I have sought to examine the tools which the preacher must use to fashion his lens.  The light that shines thru it is the light of God.

End

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